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Abstract
This paper investigates a class of attacks target-
ing the confidentiality aspect of security in Deep
Reinforcement Learning (DRL) policies. Recent
research have established the vulnerability of su-
pervised machine learning models (e.g., classifiers)
to model extraction attacks. Such attacks leverage
the loosely-restricted ability of the attacker to itera-
tively query the model for labels, thereby allowing
for the forging of a labeled dataset which can be
used to train a replica of the original model. In this
work, we demonstrate the feasibility of exploiting
imitation learning techniques in launching model
extraction attacks on DRL agents. Furthermore,
we develop proof-of-concept attacks that leverage
such techniques for black-box attacks against the
integrity of DRL policies. We also present a dis-
cussion on potential solution concepts for mitiga-
tion techniques.
1 Introduction
Recent research have established the vulnerability of super-
vised machine learning models (e.g., classifiers) to model
extraction attacks[Trame`r et al., 2016]. Such attacks lever-
age the loosely-restricted ability of the attacker to itera-
tively query the model for labels, thereby allowing for the
forging of a labeled dataset which can be used to train a
replica of the original model. Model extraction is not only
a serious risk to the protection of intellectual property, but
also a critical threat to the integrity of the model. Recent
literature[Behzadan and Munir, 2017] report that the repli-
cated model may facilitate the discovery and crafting of
adversarial examples which are transferable to the original
model.
Inspired by this area of research, this work investigates the
feasibility and impact of model extraction attacks on DRL
agents. The adversarial problem of model extraction can
be formally stated as the replication of a DRL policy based
on observations of its behavior (i.e., actions) in response to
changes in the environment (i.e., state). This problem closely
resembles that of imitation learning[Hussein et al., 2017],
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which refers to the acquisition of skills or behaviors by ob-
serving demonstrations of an expert performing those skills.
Typically, the settings of imitation learning are concerned
with learning from human demonstrations. However, it is
straightforward to deduce that the techniques developed for
those settings may also be applied to learning from artifi-
cial experts, such as DRL agents. Of particular relevance to
this research is the emerging area of Reinforcement Learning
with Expert Demonstrations (RLED)[Piot et al., 2014]. The
techniques of RLED aim to minimize the effect of modeling
imperfections on the efficacy of the final RL policy, while
minimizing the cost of training by leveraging the informa-
tion available demonstrations to reduce the search space of
the policy.
Accordingly, we hypothesize that the techniques developed
for RLED may be maliciously exploited to replicate and ma-
nipulate DRL policies. To establish the validity of this hy-
pothesis, we investigate the feasibility of RLED techniques
in utilizing limited passive (i.e., non-interfering) observations
of a DRL agent to replicate its policy with sufficient accu-
racy to facilitate attacks on their integrity. To develop proof-
of-concept attacks, we study the adversarial utility of adopt-
ing a recently proposed RLED technique, known as Deep Q-
Learning from Demonstrations (DQfD)[Hester et al., 2018]
for black-box state-space manipulation attacks, and develop
two attack mechanisms based on this technique. Furthermore,
we present a discussion on potential mitigation techniques,
and present a solution concept for defending against policy
imitation attacks.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Sectio
2 presents an overview of the DQfD algorithm used in this
study for adversarial imitation. Section 3 proposes the first
proof-of-concept black-box attack based on imitated policies,
and presents experimental evaluation of its feasibility and per-
formance. Section 4 studies the transferability of adversarial
examples between replicated and the original policies as a
second proof-of-concept attack technique. The paper con-
cludes with a discussion on potential mitigation techniques
and a solution concept in Section 5.
2 Deep Q-Learning from Demonstrations
(DQfD)
The DQfD technique[Hester et al., 2018] aims to overcome
the inaccuracies of simulation environments and models of
complex phenomenon by enabling DRL agents to learn as
much as possible from expert demonstrations before training
on the real system. More formally, the objective of this “pre-
training” phase is to learn an imitation of the expert’s behav-
ior with a value function that is compatible with the Bellman
equation, thereby enabling the agent to update this value func-
tion via TD updates through direct interaction with the envi-
ronment after the pre-training stage. To achieve such an im-
itation from limited demonstration data during pre-training,
the agent trains on sampled mini-batches of demonstrations
to train a deep neural network model in a supervised man-
ner. However, the training objective of this model in DQfD is
the minimization of a hybrid loss, comprised of the following
components:
1. 1-step double Q-learning loss JDQ(Q),
2. Supervised large margin classification loss JE(Q) =
maxa∈A[Q(s, a)+l(aE , a)]−Q(s, aE), where aE is the
expert’s action in state s and l(aE, a) is a margin func-
tion that is positive if a 6= aE , and is 0 when a = aE .
3. (n = 10)-step Return: rt+ γrt+1+ ...+ γ
n−1rt+n−1+
maxa γ
nQ(st+n, a).
4. L2 regularization loss: JL2(Q)
The total loss is given by:
J(Q) = JDQ(Q) + λ1Jn(Q) + λ2JE(Q) + λ3JL2(Q) (1)
where λ factors provide the weighting between the losses.
After the pre-training phase, the agent begins interacting
with the system and collecting self-generated data, which is
added to the replay bufferDreplay . Once the buffer is full, the
agent only overwrites the self-generated data and leaves the
demonstration data untouched for use in the coming updates
of the model. The complete training procedure for DQfD is
presented in Algorithm 1.
3 Adversarial Policy Imitation for Black-Box
Attacks
Consider an adversary who aims to maximally reduce the
cumulative discounted return (R(T )) of a target DRL agent
by manipulating the behavior of the target’s policy pi(s)
via perturbing its observations. The adversary is also con-
strained to minimizing the total cost of perturbations given by
Cadv(T ) =
∑T
t=t0 cadv(t), where cadv(t) = 1 if the adver-
sary perturbs the state at time t, and cadv(t) = 0 otherwise.
The adversary is unaware of pi(s) and its parameters. How-
ever, it has access to a replica of the target’s environment
(e.g., the simulation environment). Also, for any state tran-
sition (s, a) → s′), the adversary can perfectly observe the
target’s reward signal r(s, a, s
′), and is able to observe the
behavior of pi(s) in response to each state s. Furthermore, the
adversary is able to manipulate its target’s state observations,
but not its reward signal. Also, it is assumed that all targeted
perturbations of the adversary are successful.
Algorithm 1 Deep Q-learning from Demonstrations (DQfD)
Inputs: Dreplay initialized with demonstration data, ran-
domly initialized weights for the behavior network θ, ran-
domly initialized weights for the target network θ′, up-
dating frequency of the target network τ , number of pre-
training gradient updates k
for steps t ∈ {1, 2, ..., k} do
Sample a mini-batch of n transitions fromDreplay with
prioritization
Calculate loss J(Q) based on target network
Perform a gradient descent step to update θ
if t mod τ = 0 then
θ′ ← θ
end if
end for
for steps t ∈ {1, 2, ...} do
Sample action from behavior policy a piǫQθ
Apply action a and observe (s′, r)
Store (s, a, r, s′) into Dreplay , overwriting oldest self-
generated transition if over capacity
Sample a mini-batch of n transitions fromDreplay with
prioritization
Calculate loss J(Q) using target network
Perform a gradient descent step to update θ
if t mod τ = 0 then
θ′ ← θ
end if
s← s′
end for
To study the feasibility of imitation learning as an approach
to this adversarial problem, we consider the first step of the
adversary to be the imitation of pi(s) via DQfD to learn an
imitated policy p˜i. With this imitation at hand, the attack
problem can be reformulated to finding an optimal adversar-
ial control policy piadv(s), where the control actions are two-
fold: whether to perturb the current state to induce the worst
possible action (i.e., argminaQ(s, a) or to leave the state
unperturbed. This setting allows for the direct adoption of
the DRL-based technique proposed in [awaiting appearance
on Arxiv1] for resilience benchmarking of DRL policies. In
this technique, the test-time resilience of a policy pi∗ to state-
space perturbations is obtained via an adversarial DRL train-
ing procedure, outlined as follows:
1. Train the adversarial agent against the target following
pi in its training environment according to the reward as-
signment process outlined in Algorithm 2. report the
optimal adversarial return R∗perturbed and the maximum
adversarial regret R∗adv(T ), which is the difference be-
tween maximum achievable return by the target pi and
its minimum achieved return from actions of adversarial
policy.
2. Apply the adversarial policy against the target in N
episodes, record total cost Cadv for each episode,
3. Report the average ofCadv overN episodes as the mean
1http://www.vbehzadan.com/drafts/RobustBenchmark.pdf
test-time resilience of pi in the given environment.
. While the original technique is dependent on the availabil-
ity of target’s optimal state-action value function, we propose
to replace this function with the Q-function obtained from
DQfD imitation of the target policy, denoted by Q˜.
2:
Algorithm 2 Reward Assignment in Adversarial DRL for
Measuring Adversarial Resilience
Require: Target policy pi∗, Perturbation cost function
cadv(., .), Maximum achievable score Rmax, Optimal
state-action value function Q∗(., .), Current adversarial
policy piadv, Current state st, Current count of adversarial
actions AdvCount, Current score Rt
Set ToPerturb← piadv(st)
if ToPerturb is False then
at ← pi
∗(st)
Reward← 0
else
a′t ← argminaQ
∗(st, a)
Reward← −cadv(st, a
′
t)
end if
if either st or s
′
t is terminal then
Reward+ = (Rmax −Rt)
end if
With the imitated state-action value function Q˜ at hand,
the adversarial policy can be trained as a DRL agent with the
procedure outlined in [awaiting appearance on Arxiv2]. The
proposed attack procedure is summarized as follows:
1. Observe and recordN interactions (st, at, st+1, rt+1) of
the target agent with the environment.
2. Apply DQFD to learn an imitation of the target policy
pi(s) andQ∗, denoted by p˜i and Q˜, respectively.
3. Train adversarial policy piadv(s)with Algorithm 2, using
Q˜ as an approximation of target’s Q∗.
4. Apply adversarial policy to the target environment.
3.1 Experiment Setup
We consider a DQN-based adversarial agent, aiming to learn
an optimal adversarial state-perturbation policy to minimize
the return of its targets, consisting of DQN, A2C, and PPO2
policies trained in the CartPole environment. The architecture
and hyperparameters of the adversary and its targets are the
same as those detailed in [awaiting appearance on Arxiv3].
The adversary employs a DQfD agent to learn an imitation
of each target, the hyperparameters of which are provided in
Table 1.
3.2 Results
Figures 1 – 3 illustrate the first 100000 training steps of DQfD
from 5000 observations obtained fromDQN, A2C, and PPO2
policies in CartPole. While this limited window of training
2http://www.vbehzadan.com/drafts/RobustBenchmark.pdf
3http://www.vbehzadan.com/drafts/RobustBenchmark.pdf
Pretraining Steps 5000
Large Margin 0.8
Imitation Loss Coefficient 1
Target Update Freq. 1000
n-steps 10
γ 0.99
Table 1: Parameters of DQfD Agent
is not long enough for convergence to an optimal policy in
CartPole, the following results demonstrate its sufficiency for
deriving adversarial perturbation policies for all three targets.
With the imitated policies at hand, the next step is to train
an adversarial policy for efficient perturbation of these tar-
gets. Figures 4 – 11 present the results obtained from adopt-
ing the procedure presented in Algorithm 2 for this purposes.
These results demonstrate that not only the limited training
period is sufficient for obtaining an efficient adversarial pol-
icy, but also that launching efficient attacks remain feasible
with relatively few observations (i.e., 2500 and 1000). How-
ever, the comparison of test-time performance of these poli-
cies (presented in table 2) indicates that the efficiency of at-
tacks decreases with lower numbers of observations.
0 20000 40000 60000 80000 100000
Training Step
55
60
65
70
75
80
Re
wa
rd
Figure 1: DQfD Training Progress on DQN Policy with 5k demon-
strations
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Figure 2: DQfD Training Progress on A2C Policy with 5k demon-
strations
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Figure 3: DQfD Training Progress on PPO2 Policy with 5k demon-
strations
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Figure 4: Adversarial Training Progress on DQN Policy with 5k
demonstrations
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Figure 5: Adversarial Training Progress on DQN Policy with 2.5k
demonstrations
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Figure 6: Adversarial Training Progress on DQN Policy with 1k
demonstrations
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Figure 7: Adversarial Training Progress on A2C Policy with 5k
demonstrations
0 20000 40000 60000 80000 100000
Steps
360
380
400
420
440
460
480
M
ea
n 
10
0 
Ep
iso
de
 R
eg
re
t
Regret No. Perturbations
10
15
20
25
30
35
No
. P
er
tu
rb
at
io
ns
 P
er
 E
pi
so
de
 (1
00
 E
pi
so
de
s M
ea
n)
Figure 8: Adversarial Training Progress on A2C Policy with 2.5k
demonstrations
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Figure 9: Adversarial Training Progress on A2C Policy with 1k
demonstrations
PPO2
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Figure 10: Adversarial Training Progress on PPO2 Policy with 5k
demonstrations
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Figure 11: Adversarial Training Progress on PPO2 Policy with 2.5k
demonstrations
Target Policy Avg. Regret Avg. No. Perturbations
DQN-5k 490.73 7.12
DQN-2.5k 488.12 8.09
DQN-1k 486.37 10.55
A2C-5k 490.88 8.48
A2C-2.5k 487.64 8.73
A2C-1k 487.21 6.23
PPO2-5k 490.23 8.73
PPO2-2.5k 487.23 7.76
PPO2-1k 477.61 7.31
Table 2: Comparison of Test-Time Performances of Adversarial
Policies
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Figure 12: Adversarial Training Progress on PPO2 Policy with 1k
demonstrations
4 Transferability of Adversarial Example
Attacks on Imitated Policies
It is well-established that adversarial examples crafted
for a supervised model can be used to attack another
model trained on a similar dataset as that of the orig-
inal model[Liu et al., 2016]. Furthermore, Behzadan et
al.[Behzadan and Munir, 2017] demonstrate that adversarial
examples crafted for one DRL policy can transfer to another
policy trained in the same environment. Inspired by these
findings, we hypothesize that adversarial examples generated
for an imitated policy can also transfer to the original policy.
To evaluate this claim, we propose the following procedure
for black-box adversarial example attacks on DRL policies
based on DQfD-based policy imitation:
1. Learn an imitation of the target policy pi, denoted as p˜i.
2. Craft adversarial examples for p˜i.
3. Apply the same adversarial examples to the target’s
pi(s).
4.1 Experiment Setup
We consider a set of targets consisting of the 9 imitated poli-
cies obtained in the previous section (i.e., DQN, A2C, PPO2,
trained on each case of beginningwith 5k, 2.5k, and 1k expert
demonstrations). In test-time runs of each policy, we con-
struct adversarial examples of each state against the imitated
Target Policy Avg. No. Successful Transfers Per Episode
DQN-5k 175.11
DQN-2.5k 78.19
DQN-1k 3.30
A2C-5k 156.44
A2C-2.5k 151.47
A2C-1k 21.58
PPO2-5k 173.94
PPO2-2.5k 112.96
PPO2-1k 74.71
Table 3: No. of Successful Transfers Per Episode of Length 500
(100 Episode Mean)
policy, using FGSM with perturbation step size eps = 0.01
and perturbation boundaries [−5.0, 5.0]. If such a perturba-
tion is found, we then present it to the original policy. If the
action selected by the original policy changes as a result of the
perturbed input, then the adversarial example is successfully
transferred from the imitated policy to the original policy.
4.2 Results
Table 3 presents the number of successful transfers averaged
over 100 consecutive episodes. These results verify the hy-
pothesis that adversarial examples can transfer from an imi-
tated policy to the original, thereby enabling a new approach
to the adversarial problem of black-box attacks. Furthermore,
the results indicate that the transferability improveswith more
demonstrations. This observation is in agreement with the
general explanation of transferability: higher numbers of ex-
pert demonstrations decrease the gap between the distribution
of training data used by the original policy and that of the imi-
tated policy. Hence, the likelihood of transferability increases
with more demonstrations.
5 Discussion on Potential Defenses
Mitigation of adversarial policy imitation is achieved by in-
creasing the cost of such attacks to the adversary. A promis-
ing venue of research in this area is that of policy randomiza-
tion. However, such randomization may lead to unacceptable
degradation of the agent’s performance. To address this is-
sue, we envision a class of solutions based on the Constrained
Randomization of Policy (CRoP). Such techniques will in-
trinsically account for the trade-off between the mitigation of
policy imitation and the inevitable loss of returns. The corre-
sponding research challenge in developing CRoP techniques
is to find efficient and feasible constraints, which restrict the
set of possible random actions at each state s to those whose
selection is guaranteed (or are likely within defined certainty)
to incur a total regret that is less than a maximum tolerable
amount Ωmax. One potential choice of constraint is those
applied to the Q-values of actions, leading to the technique
detailed in Algorithm 3. However, analyzing the feasibil-
ity of this approach will require the development of models
that explain and predict the quantitative relationship between
number of observations and accuracy of estimation. With this
model at hand, the next step is to determine the saddle-point
(or region) in the minimax settings of keeping the threshold
Ωmax low, while providing maximum protection against ad-
versarial imitation learning. This extensive line of research is
beyond the scope of this dissertation, and is only introduced
as a potential venue of future work to interested readers.
Algorithm 3 Solution Concept for Constrained Randomiza-
tion of Policy (CRoP)
Require: state-action value function Q(., .), maximum tol-
erable loss Ωmax, set of actions A
while Running do
s = env(t = 0)
for each step of the episode do
FeasibleActions = {}
a = argmaxaQ(s, a)
Append a to FeasibleActions
for a′ ∈ A do
if Q(s, a)−Q(s, a′) ≥ Ωmax then
Append a′ to FeasibleActions
end if
end for
if |FeasibleActions| > 1 then
a← random(FeasibleActions)
end if
s′ = env(s, a)
s← s′
end for
end while
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